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Abstract 
This study was designed to test the power of an additive versus a weighted 
average model of impression formation in predicting the subject's evaluation 
of a stimulus object on the basis of the subject's prior evaluation of separ-
ate pieces of information used to describe the stimulus object. Two hundred 
ten subjects were randomly placed in one of fourteen experimental groups. The 
general design of the study was a 2 x 7 factorial involving two orders of pre-
sentation of stimulus material and seven levels of affective information. 
With regard to levels of affective information, the subject received either 
one, two or three pie~es of information about the stimulus object - each piece 
varying in affective importance to the subject, i.e., High affective importance 
Medium, low or the combinations High-Medium, High-low, Medium-low or High-
Medium-low. 
With regard to order of presentation of stimulus material, subjects re-
ceived their information in a manner such that the addition of each successive 
piece of information had less affective importance: e.g., High-Medium-low, 
High-Medium, High-low, Medium-low, High alone, Medium alone and low alone or 
the subjects received their information in such a manner that the addition 
of each successive piece of information had more affective importance e.g., 
low-Medium-High, Medium-High, low-High, Low-Medium, High alone, Medium alone 
or low alone. 
On the basis of each subject's evaluation of each piece of information 
alone, predicted scores were calculated for the subject's obtained evaluation 
of the stimulus object on the basis of Fishbein's summation model, and Izzet~s 
Fulcrum model (an averaging model). 
vi 
Resul~s indicated that the predicted scores derived from the Fulcrum 
(averaging) model correlated to a significantly greater extent with the ob-
tained evaluation of the stimulus object than those scores derived from Fish-
bein' s summation model. Also, there was no main effect for order of present-
ation of stimulus information and no interaction between order of presentation 
and levels of information, however, there was a significant main effect due 
to amount of information presented. The main effect due to amount of informa-
tion presented supported the Fulcrum model at the .E< .001 level, i.e., de-
scribing a stimulus object with two or more pieces of information varying in 
affect and importance but all having the same sign (positive) results in a 
~ favorable impression of the stimulus object than what would have been ob-
tained had the stimulus object been described by only one piece of information 
- namely, that piece which has the highest affect x importance rating of the 
two piece combination. 
The conclusion drawn from this finding was that as a result of obtaining 
one piece of information about the stimulus object having high affect and 
importance, t.he subject develops a generalized expectation that the stimulus 
object will be high on all traits or characteristics and that as a result of 
being given a second piece of infonnation about the stimulus object which does 
not measure up to the subject's expectations, the adaptation level of the sub-
ject concerning future expectations about the stimulus object drops - hence 
the av~raging effect. 
v'ii 
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A FULCRUM MODEL OF OPINION FORMATION 
AND CHANGE 
Richard R. Izzett 
IJ:>yola University, Chicago 
In recent years, the literature in the area of attitude formation and 
change bas been expanding at a rapid rate. Since the Hovland, Janis and 
Kelley (1953) Yale communication series, social-psychologists have turned 
their attention to a number of basic issues involved in attitude formation 
and change: effects of source credibility, ego-involvement in the issue, 
primacy-recency effects, the effect of cornmunicator-comrnunicatee discrepancy, 
the importance of attention, comprehension and acceptance of message to atti-
tude change, active versus passive participation, the effects of repetition, 
one-sided versus two-sided communications, the sleeper effect and so on. 
Out of this mass of research have emerged two basic camps: the cognitive 
consistency theorists exemplified by Heider (1946), Newcomb (1953), Feather 
(1964), Festinger (1957), Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) and M. Rosenberg and 
Abelson (1960) who advocate that attitude formation and change is a function 
of the individual's striving for a state of cognitive balance and that when-
ever imbalance occurs the individual will seek any one of a number of ways 
to restore balance such as source derogation, denial of source advocating the 
communication or attitude change itself. Secondly, there are the reinforce-
ment theorists who utilize concepts of behavioristic psychology to explain 
attitude formation and change. Theorists such as Hovland, Janis and Kelley 
·(1953), Sta~ts (1961), wtt (1955) and Fishbein (1961) argue that attitudf! 
---
change may be a function of the reward value associated with a particular 
position. An individual may hold a particular attitude toward an attitude 
object, because the position is advocated by a source who has been associated 
with rewarding experiences in the past, because the position itself is intrin-
sically satisfying and fits in with one's own values or because the particular 
position has been successful in the past as a means to some desired end. 
Regardless of the camp which the individual follows, it is evident and 
must be conceded that an individual's attitude toward a given attitude object 
is in part a function of the information he has about the attitudinal object. 
Rhine (1958) has indicated that the more unique the stimuli defining a concept 
the more clearly defined the concept, i.e., the more information an individual 
is given about an attitudinal object, the more informed and knowledgeable the 
individual is about the defining characteristics of that class of objects. 
For example, the more physical defining characteristics a child is given about 
a dog, the stronger the child's belief that a given object is a dog providing 
the object of his inspection has all the defining characteristics. 
The area of impression formation provides a fertile field within which 
to explore the function that information plays in shaping a person's attitude 
toward a given object of perception. As indicated by s. Rosenberg (1968) 
the typical impression formation experiment involves the presentation of a 
list of adjectives describing the object person to the subject and then the 
measurement of the subject's attitude to the stimulus person so described. 
A general question that has arisen in this field is: can the overall rating 
of attractiveness of an object be predicted from the scale values of the 
attractiveness of each adjective alone, i.e., does there exist within the 
.2 I 
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precise language of mathematics a general mathematical function which may be 
utilized to predict the overall impression of an attitude object based upon 
the scale values of each piece of information prior to combination? 
Two general models have been put forth - one an additive model and the 
other an averaging or weighted average model each originating from the rein-
forcement theorists' and consistency theoriests' camps respectively. In a 
test of the utility of an additive model, N. Anderson (1962) had his subjects 
rate on a 20 point scale of attractiveness, a number of hypothetical persons 
who were described by a set of three adjectives. Here Anderson found a carrel-
ation of 0.967 between the obtained and the predicted scores based on the 
additive model. However, in Anderson's case, definitive evidence in favor of 
an additive model was not provided since a comparative prediction was not de~ 
termined for an averaging model. Likewise, Levy and Richter (1963) using 
facial photographs as stimuli found evidence supporting the proposition that 
individual items of information combine in an additive manner to determine 
the overall impression of the stimulus object. But again as in the case of 
the 1962 Anderson study, no comparable predictions were attempted for an aver-
aging model. Further evidence supporting cognitive SU.'TU1lation has been obtained 
by Feldman (1962), Kerrick (19.58), Podell and Podell (1963) and Tanka (1964). 
Following this line of thinking, Fishbein (1961, 1963, and 196.5) has 
developed a summation theory of attitude organization and change which is 
based upon the relation~hips between beliefs about an object and the attitude 
toward the object. Fishbein's theory would predict that an individual's 
attitude toward any given object would be a function of the individual's 
beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs. Also. 
,3 
Fishbein's theory would predict that the individual's attitude toward an ob-
ject is in part a function of the total amount of affect associated with each 
of the beliefs about the object, i.e., infonnation about an attitudinal ob-
ject is combined in an additive fashion. This may be represented by the fol-
lowing fonnula: 
where 
A0 = the attitude toward a given object "o" 
Bi_ = the strength of the belief i about o. Here 
Fishbein defines belief as the probability 
dimension of a concept, where the probability 
dimension may refer to the belief in a concept 
(the probability that the concept does exist), 
or the belief about a concept (the probability 
that a specific relation exists between the 
concept and some other object). Operationally, 
the beliefs in or about a concept are measured 
by an instrument called the B scale (Fishbein 
and Raven, 1962). 
ai = the evaluati:ve aspect of Bi which is operationally 
measured by a series of Osgood's evaluative seman-
tic differential scales. 
N = the number of beliefso 
Fishbein bas evidenced support for his summation theory in a series 
of studies (Fishbein and Hunter, 1964; Triandis and Fishbein, 1963; L. Ander-
son and Fishbein, 1965). As pointed out by S. Rosenberg (1968), a critical 
test of the difference between the summation and averaging fonnulations can 
be illustrated by the following question: "If a subject is presented with a 
single highly desirable trait adjective, will this result in a more favorable 
impression than if he were presented with the same highly desirable adjective 
along with another adjective that is only moderately desirable?" (p. 191). 
In a test of the adequacy of the summation model in answering this question, 
4 
Fishbein and Hunter presented four groups of subjects with varying amounts of 
positively evaluated information about a stimulus person in such a way that 
the average amount of affect which was associated with the information decreas-
ed as a function of the amount of information presented. The total amount of 
affect, however, increased with the amount of information presented. Fishbein 
and Hunter contended that the results of this study lend support to their sum-
~ation model, i.e., the obtained evaluation of the stimulus object increased as 
a function of the amount of information presented even though the average amount 
of affect associated with the information decreased. Rosenberg, however, points 
out that the interpretation of Fishbein and Hunter's data in support of an add-
itive model is not unequivocal since the information presented about the stim-
ulus object was presented sequentially - with the more favorable information 
consistently being presented before the less favorable information. As Rosen-
berg indicated, sequential presentation of information may result in differ-
ential weighting of the information. 
In a further test of Fishbein's summation model, and overcoming the crit-
icisms of the Anderson (1962) study and the Levy and Richter (1963) study made 
by Rosenberg (1968), L. Anderson and Fishbein (1965) compared the predictive 
power of Fishbein's summation theory to that of Osgood's (1955) congruity 
theory. In contrast to Osgood's congruity theory which predicts that an atti-
tude is in part a function of the average amount of affect associated with the 
information, again Fishbein predicted that the individual's attitude would be 
a function of the total amount of affect and not just the average. Not only 
did the mean ratings of all groups support summation theory but Fishbein also 
found that predictions based on his theory correlated significantly higher 
with the obtained attitude scores than the predictions stemming from Osgood's 
5 
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congruity theory. 
Norman Anderson (1965) also conducted a study to make a comparative test 
of the summation and averaging models. Anderson presented various sets of 
two and four adjectives varying in degree of affectiveness to his subjects. 
The two groups of primary concern in testing the summation prediction versus 
the averaging prediction were those that received either two pieces of high 
positive information (HH) and those that received four pieces of information -
two high positive and two medium positive (Hill'TI1). According to summation 
theory, that group of subjects which received the four pieces of information 
(HHMM) should rate the stimulus object to a more favorable degree than that 
group of subjects which received only two pieces of' high positive information 
(HH). Anderson obtained significant results; however, the results were in 
support of an averaging theory, i.e., that group of subjects which received 
HHMM information rated the stimulus object ~ favorable than that group 
which received the HH information. Anderson also obtained a finding which 
would seem to contradict the averaging model. He found that the mean rating 
of the group of subjects given four high positive pieces of infonnation (HHMM) 
was greater than that group given just two high positive pieces of information 
(HH). This finding would seem to support the summation model over the averag-
ing mocel. Rosenberg indicates that this finding can be accounted for by an 
averaging model if one assumes the existence of an initial impr•:ission such 
that tbe final impression is an average of the affect associated with the 
stimulus information presented as well as the initial impression. One of the 
weaknesses of Anderson's work in this area, is that in utilizing an averaging 
model, he has been assuming that the stimulus information which he presents 
to his subjects all have equal weights, i.e., in combining the four pieces 
6 
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of )nforn:.ation HHNM, he would predict the obtained evaluation of the stimulus 
object to be a function of the sum of the affect associated with each piece 
of information divided by four (the number of pieces of information). However, 
in the same study, Anderson (1965) found that the average of the subject's 
impression rating of the stimulus object described by tbe information LLLL 
and the stimulus object Mr1-M-M- did not equal the rating that the subject 
gave to the stimulus object described by the information LIM-M-. In effect 
his results suggested that the L adjectives were given greater weight than 
the M- adjectives, i.e., that even when subjects were instructed that each 
of the adjectives are equally important, they may in fact not pay equal attent-
ion to all adjectives (some adjectives being given greater weight than others). 
Anderson and Jacobson (1965) also found differential weighting effects 
not only when the information about the stimulus object is affectively in-
consistent but also when it is semantically inconsistent. Thus as Rosenberg 
(1968) indicates, the assumption of equal weights does not always appear to 
be completely adequate. Also, results of a study by Podell and Podell (1963) 
suggest that extreme adjectives (H) are given greater weight than other ad-
jectives and hence some subjects when presented with stimulus information may 
even go so far as to assigning weights of zero to some information. 
Another weakness of the work by Anderson dealing with an averaging model 
of impression formation has to do with the underlying psychological processes 
involved within the subject. Thus far, the work of Anderson has remained at 
the descriptive level, ~e., demonstrating that within his experiments in-
formation presented to the subject seems to combine in an averaging fashion 
and not in a summation fashion, but he does not attempt to explain this 
phenomenon. Thus, in an attempt to further investigate the summation versus 
7 
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averaging conflict in impression and opinion formation and in an attempt to 
give more precise meaning to the weight given to stimulus information and in 
an attempt to explain the underlying psychological processes involved, the 
following fulcrum model is postulated. 
One may look at the area of impression formation and opinion formation 
in terms of a physical analogy based on principles of physics. Consider for 
example a typical balance scale where the fulcrum of the scaie represents 
a balance point (viz. a teeter-totter). If we take for a starting point the 
case where the individual is totally unfamiliar with the stimulus object 
whether it be a person in the case of impression formation or an issue in 
the case of opinion formation, one can represent the psychological state of 
the individual in the following manner: 
extremely 
unfavorable ~ 
-t 
Fulcrum 
extremely 
favorable 
Here the individual has no information whatever about the stimulus object and 
hence his point of balance (represented by the fulcrum) will fall in the 
middle of tbe scale in the neutral zone, i.e., if one were to·conceptualize 
a teeter-totter that was perfectly balanced which had no weights placed on 
either side (in our case the weights being pieces of information), the pivotal 
point (fulcrum) or point of balance would be directly in the middle. 
Now if a weight were to be placed on either side of the teeter-totter, 
the plan~ itself would tilt down in the direction of the weighted end. Graph-
ically, this may be represented as follows: 
8' 
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LS 
,rweight added 
0 hence 
In order for the plank itself to be restored to a level state, the weight 
would have to be removed, another weight added on the other side of the ful-
crum, or the fulcrum itself would have to shift in the direction of the 
weight. Graphically this may be represented as follows: 
No Weight 1 Weight 
0 
Going back to our impression formation situation then, the plank may be 
said to represent a scale of affect ranging from extremely unfavorable at 
one end of the scale through a neutral zone to an extremely favorable position 
at the other end of the plank. It is apparent then that any one weight (piece 
of information) will have three components. First, it will have direction, 
i.e., it will fall to either the left or right side of the fulcrum; secondly, 
it will have extremity; :i.e.' if it falls on the right side it may fall right 
next to the fulcrum or it may fall at the extreme end of the plank or at any 
intermediate value between these two points. Thirdly, the weight itself will 
vary in size (intensity). For example, consider the case of two pieces of 
information having the same direction, the same extremity but different 
intensities. One situation would be represented as follows: 
0 
ZS: 
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and the other as: 
0 
let us consider now a number of hypothetical situations concerning opin-
ion formation in a physical sense. 
A. 
B. 
c. 
D. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 ,., 
,-_------------·) /\ 
, ___ .. ~
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
-e-----/\ ~ .\ 
./·--
0 
0 
0 
0 
In situation f;,, the individual is totally unfamiliar with the issue and 
bas no information whatsoever about the issue and hence the fulcrum is in the 
middle of the plank representing a neutral position concerning the stimulus 
object. 
In situation ], the individual has been given four pieces of information 
supporting the exact same position and all pieces of information have the 
same intensity; hence the fulcrum bas nov shifted to a point of balance dir-
10 
--
ectly under the four pieces of information thus representing the individual's 
new position on the issue. 
In situation £, the individual has been given two new pieces of information 
which have a different direction and extremity than the information given in 
situation ~ and hence the fulcrum will shift again but this time in the dir-
ection of the two new pieces of information. Also, the amount of the shift 
will not be as much as advocated by the two new pieces of information (were 
the other four pieces not already existing). Instead, there will only be a 
partial change in the direction advocated - the shift being to a point of 
balance betwe_en the two new pieces of information and the four old pieceso 
Notice that in the above "three situations, it is assumed that all the 
pieces of information have the same intensity or weight (represented by the 
same sized circles), although they do have different direction and extremity. 
. . 
However, as pointed out above, different pieces of information may have differ-
ent weights and it may be that one piece of information will be of sufficient 
intensity to counterbalance.a number of other pieces of information of lesser 
intensity. Hence in situation ,!2 we have an example of the occasion where one 
piece of intense information counterbalances a number of other pieces of lesser 
intensity. 
For example, an individual may be prejudiced against negroes because they 
are "lazy", "dirty", "uneducated" and "unreliable". One may hold this atti-
tude toward negroes for a long time, however, the attitude may be changed by 
one piece of intense information. Suppose for example, that a negro saved 
the life of the prejudiced white man as well as the lives of his wife and 
children. This one piece of evaluative information may be of sufficient in-
11' 
to counterbalance his former prejudicial attitude. 
As is evident from the above figures, the more knowledge the individual 
has supporting a given direction and extremity, the more difficult it will 
be to change his position concerning a given issue because the more inform-
ation the individual has the more weighted the plank will become in a given 
direction and the more information it will take to change his position or 
the more intense the information will have to be. 
What are the implications of this fulcrum model with regard to the add-
itive-average conflict in impression formation? First of all let direction 
and extremity of a piece of information operationally be measured by a series 
of Osgood's affective semantic differential scales and secondly, let us con-
sider the intensity or weight of the piece of information to be operationally 
measured by a 7-point importance scale; then having these values for any one 
piece of information taken alone, one should be able to predict on the basis 
of the principles derived from the fulcrum model the outcome of any combina-
tion of two or more pieces of information. With regard to the summation-
averaging conflict, it was pointed out that the critical question concerned 
that situation where the individual is given two or more pieces ·of information 
which have the same direction but different or varying amounts of extremity 
and intensity. That is in a situation where the individual is first given 
one piece of information with high affect and then a second piece of inform-
ation with low affect but the same sign! summation theory predicts an add-
itive effect (i.e., the combination of the two pieces of information will re-
sult in a more favorable impression than the one piece of high affect inform-
ation given alone); however, the averaging theory would predict that the com-
12· 
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bination of the two pieces of information would result in an impression of 
intermediate value between the high and low affective pieces of information. 
With regard to the fulcrum model the situation may be represented as 
follows: initially the subject has a neutral impression of the stimulus object 
since he has no information hence: 
2S 
Upon receiving one piece of information having a favorable direction and 
having extreme affect, the fulcrum will shift in the direction of that piece 
of information hence: 0 
/~- --=,:ZS: --~ 
·Upon receiving a second piece of information havi.ng the same direction 
but less extremity with regard to affect, the fulcrum will shift back in the 
direction of this second piece of information hence: 0 0 
Here it is seen that the fulcrum model makes a similar prediction to the 
averaging type models. The question still remains as to why the individual 
should decrease his evaluations of the stimulus object when presented with 
a second piece of information having the same direction. One could turn to 
helson's (1959) adaptation level theory for a possible explanation. If a 
subject is given one piece of information about a stimulus object having an 
extremely high positive affective evaluation, then the subject may formulate 
some kind of a halo effect concerning the stimulus object, i.e., the subject 
may generalize from this one piece of information and expect the stimulus 
object to have other highly positive affective qualities. When in fact the 
subject is presented with a second piece of positive information which does 
lJ. 
not quite measure up to his expectations. by contrast to the first piece of 
information the subject:.will be disappointed, i.e., his adaptation level will 
not have been reached and hence the subject will lower his evaluation of the 
stimulus object. Thus, on the basis of the fulcrum model, the following 
hypotheses are put forth: 
1. Given a situation with three pieces of information, all having the 
same direction but different with respect to affective extremity and intensity 
(importance), that group of subjects given one piece of information with high 
affect and importance (berein represented by H) will have a more favorable 
impression than (a) that group of subjects given one piece of infonnation 
with intermediate affect and importance (herein represented by M); also that 
group of subjects given one piece of information with high affect and import-
ance will have a more favorable impression than that group given one piece 
of information with low affect and importance (herein represented by 1). 
2. That group of subjects given the two pieces of information H-M 
about the stimulus object will have an evaluative rating of the stimulus ob-
ject which will fall between the evaluative ratings of that group of subjects 
given the one piece of information (H) and that group given the one piece 
of information (M). 
J. That group of subjects given the two pieces of information M-1 about 
the stimulus object will have an evaluative rating of the stimulus object 
. 
which will fall between the evaluative ratings of that group of subjects given 
the one piece of information (M) and that group given the one piece of inform-
ation (1). Furthermore, that group of subjects presented with the stimulus 
combination H-M-1 will have an evaluative rating of the stimulus object which 
will fall below the obtained evaluative ratings of that group of subjects 
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given just the one piece of information (H). 
4. On the basis of the fulcrum model the following order is predicted 
for the mean values of all combinations of information: (H)> (H-1)) (H-M)> 
(H-M-1).:> (M) 7 (M-1) /(I,). This is in contrast to Fishbein' s summation theory 
which would predict (H-M-1) )' (H-M) )' (H-1)> (M-1):::: (H)> (M) "> (L). 
Because of the possible effect of differential weighting of pieces of 
information due to sequential presentation (Anderson, 1965b; Anderson and 
Barrios, 1961), this experiment will also explore the effect of reversal of 
the order of presentation of the stimulus information for the separate groups 
receiving two or more pieces of information; hence corresponding to that 
group which obtained their information in a H-M-1 order there will be a group 
which will receive their information in a 1-M-H order; corresponding to that 
group of subjects which will obtain their information in a H-L order there 
will be a group of subjects which will receive their information in a L-H 
order; corresponding to that group of subjects which obtain their information 
in a H-M order, there will be a group of subjects which will receive their 
information in a M-H order; and finally corresponding to that group of subjects 
which receive their information in a M-1 order, there will be a group of 
subjects receiving their information in a L-M order. Although no hypothesis 
is being made on the basis of the fulcrum model, a primacy effect will be 
obtained if the L-M-H group has a more favorable impression of the stimulus 
object.than the H-M-1 group and a recency effect will be obtained if the order 
is reversed i.e., if (H-M-1)) (L-M-H) o 
Method 
;Subjects ~d Designo Two hundred ten Introductory Psychology students 
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attending Loyola University served as subjects in this study - each subject 
being randomly assigned to one of fourteen conditions. The general design 
was a 2 x 7 factorial involving two orders of presentation of stimulus material 
and seven levels of affective information. 
Issues. In order to select the stimulus material, a pilot group of 35 
subjects evaluated a number of political issues on five of Osgood's Semantic 
Differential Scales (beneficial-harmful; foolish-wise; dirty~clean; bad-good; 
and sick-healthy). A list of the political issues used are in Appendix I. 
The scales used were selected from the A scale of Fishbein and Raven (1962) 
and were utilized in order to select one issue of high positive affect, low 
positive affect and an issue of intermediate positive affect. Each scale 
then, consisted of a set of polar adjectives separated by the seven points 
of the scale. Thus, each concept rated could obtain a score ranging from 
-15 (negative evaluation) to +15 (positive evaluation). Also, each subject 
rated each issue on a seven point importance scale set up in semantic differ-
ential form with the polar adjectives being "extremely impo_rtant" at one end 
and "extremely unimportant" at the other end. For example, the subject was 
asked, "How important do you consider the above issue, that is, how important 
is the above issue to you7" This is illustrated as follows: 
extremely: : extremely unimportant 
important 
The importance measure was scored by assigning a weight of 1 to the slot 
closest to the phrase "extremely unimportant" and a weight of 7 to the slot 
closest to·the phrase "extremely important" and intermediate weights to those 
slots between the two ends. In this way, the weight or intensity of any one 
piece of information could be determined for each subject. Thus, on the basis 
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of the products obtained from the two scales (affective scales and importance 
scale) any one subject could obtain a score rangjng from (7) (-15) or -105 to 
, (?) (+15) or +105. 
The issues selected consisted of (a) the one issue which had the highest 
positive evaluative x importance rating on the pilot test (attacking organized 
crime - mean rating = 57.7); (b) the one issue which had the lowest but pos-
itive evaluative x importance rating (European Common Market - mean rating 
= 14.7); and (c) an issue which had an intermediate evaluative x importance 
rating (highway· expansion program - mean rating= J8.6), i.e., an issue having 
an evaluative x importance rating falling between attacking organized crime 
and the European Common Market. An analysis of variance performed on these 
ratings indicated that the issues were significantly different from one another 
(f = 28.5999; df = 2, 102; .E <.001) and a Duncan's Multiple Range test in-
dicated that the mean evaluative x importance rating for attacking organized 
crime was significantly more favorable ~han the mean evaluative x importance 
rating for the highway expansion program (,E<.005) which in turn was sig-
nificantly more favorable than the mean evaluative x importance rating for 
the European Common Market (,E<.005). These three issues were selected be-
cause they fitted the necessary criteria of using one issue of high positive 
affect x importance score falling midway between the high and the low issues. 
Note that the obtained mean evaluative x importance scores have a 20 point 
interval between them (low= 14.7; intermediate = J8.6; high = 57.7). Also, 
these three issues bad considerably less variance than any of the other pre-
tested issues. 
Experimental Procedure. Subjects in the actual study were given a test 
booklet, the fjrst few pages of which contained a number of filler issues in 
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addition to the three issues of attacking organized crime (]igh), highway 
expansion program (11edium), and the European Common Market (fow). The partic-
ular issue to be evaluated on each page was centered at the top and enclosed 
in parentheses. The subjects were instructed as follows: "On this page and 
on each of the following pages you will be asked to evaluate a number of 
topics. The issue to be evaluated will be centered in the middle of the page 
and enclosed by parentheses. Following the issue will be a number of seven 
point scales. Place an "x11 in the appropriate space on these seven-point 
scales. For example, if you feel that the issue is very good you might place 
your "x" as shown below: 11 
bad: 
very 
• 
neutral 
X : good 
very 
The subjects then proceeded to rate the three issues of concern along 
with a number of filler issues on the above mentioned Osgood Semantic Differ-
ential Scales as well as five of Fishbein's (1962) B (Belief) scales. The 
Fishbein B scales utilized were impossible-possible; false-true; nonexistent-
existent; improbable-probable; unlikely-likely. These five B scales were 
interspersed with the above mentioned A scales as well as with some filler 
scales. The B scales were set up in the same fashion as the A scales and 
they were scored in the same manner. Thus, for any one issue each subject 
could have a B score ranging from -15 to +15. The B scales were utilize9 in 
order to measure each subject's belief in the concept being rated. 
After the subject evaluated the issue on the A and B scales as well as 
the filler scales, they completed their evaluation of the issue by rating 
it on an importance scale which was placed on the same page as the issue but 
immediately below the A and B scales. Here again as in the pilot group, the 
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subjects were asked: "How important do you consider the above, that is, how 
important is the above issue to you7" The subjects then checked one of seven 
positions of the seven-point scale which was illustrated above. 
Thus, on the basis of the pre-test, three scores were obtained for each 
subject on each issue: an affect score, a belief score, and an importance 
score. These three measures were determined in order to predict the obtained 
evaluation score of the stimulus object, attributed one or more of these 
three characteristics, on the basis of Fishbein's summation fbrrnula or the 
Fulcrum formula. 
After evaluating each of these three dimensions each subject was randomly 
given one of eleven communications. That is, each subject was given one, 
two or three pieces of information about a hypothetical Mr. X who was running 
for politic~l office and then after reading the communication, the subjects 
were instructed to rate the hypothetical Mr. X on a seven point scale of 
like-dislike. For example, if the subjects felt that they extremely liked 
the candidate they were instructed to place their "x" as shown below: 
extremely like: __ x ___________________ :extremely dislike 
The eleven communications represent the eleven possible combinations of 
the three pieces of information prasented singly, in combination and with 
order of presentation varied. Visually this may be represented as follows: 
Pieces of Information 
19 
Order of Presentation 
H 
M 
1 
H-M 
H-1 
M-1 
H-M-L 
H 
M 
L 
M-H 
1-H 
L-M 
L-M-H 
For example, one group of subjects was told, "Mr. X is in favor of attack-
ing organized crime" (H group); another group of subjects was told "Mr. X 
is in favor of attacking organized crime and he is in favor of the European 
Common Market" (H-1 group); and with order of presentation reversed another 
group of subjects was told ".Mr. X is in favor of the European Common Market 
and he is in favor of attacking organized crime" (1-H group). This same 
format was followed for all treatment groups. 
The obtained evaluation of the hypothetical Mr. X on the like-dislike 
scale was used to test the predictive power of Fishbein's summation theory 
and the Fulcrum theory by correlating this score with the predicted evaluation 
of the candidate based on the pre-test evaluation of the political issues 
on the A and B scales and the importance scale. 
The obtained mean ratings of the hypothetical Mr. X also served as a 
basis to compare the differential predictions stemming from t~e summation 
theory and the Fulcrum theory; i.e., to determine whether two or more pieces 
of information combined in an additive fashion as predicted via Fishbein's 
model or whether they combined in a weighted average fashion as predicted 
via th~ Fulcrum model. 
After all subjects completed the pre- and post-test evaluations, the 
experimenter informed them as to the nature of the researcho 
Results 
Pretest evaluation of three critical issueso A separate analysis of 
variance was performed on the pretest measures for each of the three pieces 
of information that were used to describe the hypothetical Mr. X. Results 
of the ANOVA for the pretest measures on the issue attacking organized crime 
(high affect and high importance) are reported in Table 1. Results indicate 
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tbat tbe 14 experimental groups were comparable in tbe pretest evaluation of 
tbe issue attacking organized crime (.[ = .5339, Qf = 13/196). 
Results of tbe ANOVA for tbe pretest measures on tbe issue of the higbway 
expansion program (intermediate affect and importance) are reported in Table 2. 
Results indicate that here also the 14 experimental groups were comparable 
witb respect to their pretest evaluation of the issue highway expansion 
program (.[ = .955, df = lJ/196). 
Table 1 
ANOVA for Pretest Measures on Issue of 
Attacking Organized Crime 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Witbin Groups 
SS 
109.985 
Jl05.539 
Table 2 
df 
lJ 
196 
MS 
8.460 
150845. 
ANOVA for Pretest Measures on Issue of 
Highway Expansion P~ogram 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
SS 
3J8.551 
5341.429 
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df 
lJ 
196 
MS 
26.042 
27.252 
F 
o5J39 
F 
.9555 
-----
Results of the ANOVA for the pretest measures on the issue of the European 
Common Market (low affect and importance) are reported in Table 3. Again the 
results indicate that the 14 experimental groups were comparable with respect 
to their pretest evaluations of the issue European Common Market (£ = .6264, 
df = 13/196). Hence all experimental groups gave comparable pretest evaluation 
of the issues used to describe the stimulus object. 
Table 3 
ANOVA for Pretest Measures on Issue of 
European Common Market 
Source of Variation 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
SS 
238.13 
5731.44 
df 
lJ 
196 
MS 
18.3177 
29.2420 
F 
06264 
Also, a separate analysis of variance was performed to determine if the 
pretest evaluations of the three pieces of information used to describe the 
stimulus object were significantly different from one another as would be 
predicted from the results of the pilot group evaluation. 
Table 4 
ANOVA for Over-all Differences Between Premeasures on 
Attacking Organized Crime, highway Expansion Program, and European Market 
Source of Variation SS df MS F 
Between Groups 2660.424 2 1330.212 _56.105* 
Within Groups 14865.243 627 23.709 
*.E < .001 
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-esults of the ANOVA are reported in Table 4. Results indicate that there 
as a significant difference in the evaluation of the three issues (£ = _56.105, 
df = 2/627, .E.< .001). A Duncan's Multiple Range test was performed on the 
means of these evaluations and results indicate that attacking organized crime 
as rated significantly more favorably than the highway expansion program 
(.E,(.001) which in turn was rated significantly more favorably than the Eur-
opean Common Market (.E,<.001). See Table 5 for these results. 
Table 5 
Duncan Multiple Range Test for Differences Between Mean Ratings on 
Pretest Measures of Attacking Organized Crime, 
Highway Expansion Program, and European Common Market 
ECM HEP AOC 
Moans 5.77 7.39 l0.7 
ECM 1.62* 4.9J* 
HEP 3.31* 
*.E < .001 
Obtained Evaluations of~ stimulus objecto With respect to the Ful-
crum model, it was predicted that the subject's evaluation of the stimulus 
object, Mr. X, would be a function not of the total amount of affect and 
importance of the affect that was associated with each of the pieces of in-
formation attributed to the stimulus object as predicted by Fishbein's sum-
ation model, but instead would be a weighted average function of the amount 
of affect and importance associated with each of the pieces of information 
attributed to the stimulus object. Table 6 presents the results of the ANOVA 
performed on the post-test measures of the evaluation of the stimulus object 
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fter having been attributed 1, 2, or 3 characteristics. Results indicate 
that there was no main effect for the order of pr~sentation of the stimulus 
information (.[ = .014, df = 1/196); there was no interaction between order 
of presentation of stimulus material and amount of information (.[ = .398, 
df = 6/196); however, there was a highly significant main effect due to the 
mount of information presented about the stimulus object (f = 8.7444, g_f = 
/196, .E <.001). 
Table 6 
ANOVA for Post-Test Rating of Stimulus Object 
Source of Variation SS df MS F 
Order (A) .019 1 .019 .014 
Information (B) 69.828 6 ll.6)8 8.744* 
Ax B J.181 6 .530 .)98 
Within Cell 260.867 196 l.JJl 
Since there was no significant m~in effect due to order of presentation 
of stimulus ~aterial, order was collapsed, and a Duncan's Multiple Range Test 
as performed on the means of the remaining seven groups. Results of this 
est are presented in Table 7. 
Inspection of this table reveals that the obtained mean ratings of the 
stimulus object for that group of subjects given only the one piece of inform-
ation 1:! rated the stimulus object significantly more favorably than those sub-
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jects given the one piece of information~ (,E.(.001); also, these same sub-
jects rated the stimulus object significantly more favorably than those sub-
jects given the one piece of information .1 (,E<.001). Although those subjects 
given the one piece of information ~ did not rate the stimulus object sig-
nificantly more favorably than those subjects given the one piece of in-
formation _1, results approach significance at the .E = .1 level. Thus, for 
both Fishbein's summation theory and Izzett's Fulcrum theory, empirical sup-
port has been obtained. 
Table 7 
Duncan Multiple Range Test for Differences Between Mean Ratings on 
Post-Test Evaluation of Stimulus Object 
L M-L M H-M-1 H-M H-L H 
Means 4.5 4.7 4.9 5.47 5.57 5.67 6.27 
L NS NS NS .01 .001 .001 0001 
M-L NS NS NS .05 .01 .01 .001 
M NS NS NS olO .05 .05 .001 
H-M-L NS NS NS NS NS NS 005 
H-M NS NS NS NS NS NS 005 
H-L NS NS NS NS NS NS .05 
The critical comparison between the two models lies in the obtained 
ratings of that group of subjects given the two pieces of information H-M 
with respect to those subjects given the one piece of information H and those 
given the one piece of information J:!; also, another critical comparison lies 
in the obtained ratings of that group of subjects given the two piece of 
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information M-L and those subjects given the one piece of infonnation M alone 
and the one piece of information L alone. 
Inspection of Table 7 reveals that those subjects given the two pieces 
of information H-M rate the stimulus object significantly more favorably than 
those subjects given the one piece of infonnation ~ (,E<.05) but significantly 
less than those subjects given the one piece of infonnation ~alone (£ <.05). 
This is in direct contrast to Fishbein's summation model but is as predicted 
by the Fulcrum model. Although those subjects given the two pieces of in-
formation M-L do not differ significantly from those just given the infonnation 
Lalone or Malone, the results are in the direction predicted by the Fulcrum 
- -
model and are directly opposite to those predicted by Fishbein's summation 
model. 
Further support is given to the Fulcrum model if one looks at that group 
of subjects which was given the two pieces of information H-L and that group 
of subjects given the three pieces of information H-M-1. Again, those sub-
jects given the two pieces of information H-1 evaluate the stimulus object 
significantly less favorably than those given the one piece of information 
E (£<.05). Again both of these findings lend support to the Fulcrum model 
and contradict Fishbein's summation model. 
Correlational Data. Two predicted attitude scores were determined for 
each subject - one based on Izzett•s Fulcrum model and the other based on 
Fishbein's summation model. 
According to the Fulcrum model, an individual's attitude toward any 
stimulus object should be a weighted average function of the sum of the 
products of the evaluative aspect of any single piece of information (Ai) 
and the importance (I) of that piece of information to the subject divided 
by the sum of the importance ratings of each of the pieces of information. 
Thus, by the direct application of the formula a predicted attitude score 
was determined for each subject i.e., 
Predicted Attitude = 
where Ai = the evaluation of the polarity of any piece of 
information about the stimulus object. 
I = the importance of any piece of information about 
the stimulus object 
N = the number of pieces of information. 
Fishbein on the other hand, predicts that an individual's attitude 
toward any given object is a function of the sum of the products of the be-
liefs about the stimulus object (Bi.) and the evaluative aspects of these 
beliefs (a1). According to the Fishbein model then, the predicted attitude 
N 
score for any one subject equals 2:Bj_ai. 
-""'I 
The intercorrelations between the two predicted scores and the obtained 
scores across all treatments are reported in Table 8. As indicated in the 
1 
2 
Table 8 
Intercorrelations of the Predicted Scores and the 
Actual Posttest Evaluation of the Attitude Object 
Fishbein 
Prediction 
(1) 
Fulcrum 
Prediction 
(2) 
·79* 
27 
Obtained 
(3) 
.4J* 
' 
II 
table both predictors are significantly correlated with the obtained scores 
(£(.005). However, the predictions based on the Fulcrum model are signifi-
cantly more accurate than the predictions based on Fishbein's summation 
model (z = 2.43, £<•01). This finding lends further support to the Fulcrum 
model and again suggests that impression formation is a weighted average 
cognitive function rather than a function of cognitive summation. Furthermore 
a partial correlation between the predicted and the obtained evaluation based 
on the Fulcrum prediction with the correlation between the Fishbein prediction 
and the obtained score partialed out results in a correlation of +.4884, 
while a partial correlation between the predicted and the obtained evaluation 
based on Fishbein's prediction with the correlation between the Fulcrum 
prediction and the obtained score partialed out results in a correlation of 
-0.1068 - a difference significant at £<.OOl (z = 6.53). 
Two further correlations were obtained for those subjects who received 
only one piece of information about the stimulus object in order to determine 
the predictive power of Fishbein's belief component (Bi) and Izzett's import-
ance component (I). The obtained correlation based on Fishbein's Bi component 
is .46 (£(.005) and the obtained correlation based on Izzett's (I) component 
is .58 (,;e(.005). However, the two correlations do not differ significantly 
from one another (z = 1.09, N.S.). Furthermore, eliminating the three groups 
]! alone, ~alone and 1 alone and working only with those groups of subjects 
receiv~ng two or more pieces of information produces a correlation of .63 
for the Fulcrum model and a correlation of .41 for Fishbein's model. The 
difference between these two correlations is significant at the ,;e(.05 level, 
again pointing to the greater predictive power of the Fulcrum model. 
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Further, a rank order correlation, rho, was obtained for both Fishbein's 
surrunation prediction and the Fulcrum weighted average prediction. According 
to Fishbein's summation model the following order for the means of the ob-
tained scores was predicted: (H-M-L) / (H-M) > (H-1)/ (M-1) = (H)> (M) )' (1). 
The obtained rank order correlation for Fishbein's model was .53. However, 
this was not significantly different from zero (z = 1.29). 
According to the Fulcrum model, the predicted rank order for the means 
of the obtained scores was (H) )' (H-L) > (H-M) > (H-M-1) > (M)) (M-1) > (L). Here 
the obtained rank order correlation was 1.00 which was significantly differ-
ent from zero (z = 2.45, _E.£. .01). Again, the evidence points to the greater 
predictive power of the Fulcrum model. 
Discussion 
This experiment set up a curcial test of the predictive powers of an 
additive model of impression formation (Fishbein) versus a weighted average 
model of impression formation (Fulcrum model) by presenting the subjects with 
one, two or three pieces of information which varied in terms of degree of 
affect and importance to the subject but with sign of affect held constant in 
all situations (positive). The results indicated that there was a significant 
I 
main affect due to the amount of information presented to the subject; more-
over, the results confirmed the prediction of the Fulcrum or weighted average 
model at the .001 level of significance and hence did not support the predict-
ions generated from Fishbein's summation model. 
The results indicated that there was no significant main effect due to 
the order of presentation of the stimulus material. One can interpret this 
in one of two ways. First of all, previous studies have indicated a primaey 
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effect for sequential presentation of stimulus information; however, although 
this study varied the order of presentation of the stimulus information, the 
information was presented in the format of either Mr. X is in favor of H-M 
or Mr. X is in favor of M-H, which would be considered as simultaneous pre-
sentation of the stimulus material. Or alternatively, one could say that 
for those subjects who received their information in the H-M-L, H-M, H-L 
M-L order, their adaptation level concerning the stimulus object was contin-
ually lower since their expectancies of the stimulus objects were not met on 
the basis of each prior piece of information and that those subjects receiving 
their information in the L-M-H, M-H, L-H, L-M order had their adaptation level 
raised with each successive piece of information. Perhaps by varying the time 
interval over a period of a few days between successive pieces of information 
a primacy effect may be obtained. 
The results also indicate that the fulcrum model bas greater power than 
a summation model in predicting the obtained evaluation of a stimulus object 
on the basis of prior knowledge with respect to the affective evaluation of 
separate piece of information about the stimulus object and the importance 
of these pieces of information to the subject; e.g., knowing the subject's 
affective evaluation of the issues "attacking organized crime" and the "high-
way expansion program" as well as the importance of these issues to the sub-
ject, one can predict the subject's evaluation of another person who is in 
favor of these two issues to a significantly greater extent on the basis of 
a weighted average model of impression formation than on the basis of an 
additive model. 
In effect what is occuring, is that if a subject is given two (or more) 
1 
pieces of. information about a stimulus object and each piece of informatior. 
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is respectively of high affect and importance (H) and intermediate affect 
and importance (M) to the subject, then he will rate the stimulus object to 
a less favorable extent than if the subject were given only one piece of 
information about the stimulus object that was of high affect and importance. 
In other words, the more positive information you give a subject about a 
stimulus object, the more likely you will lower the subject's evaluation of 
that object if all of the information does not have the same affective import-
ance to the subject. 
This phenomena could be explained in terms of the expectations of the 
subject. If a subject is given just one piece of infonnation about a stimulus 
object, and that piece of information has high positive affective importance 
to the subject, then the subject's adaptation level concerning the stimulus 
object would shift in the direction of that piece of information (Helson, 1959) 
Those subjects would then have the high expectations that any other piece of 
information about the stimulus object would also have a high affective and 
importance value. For example, if a layman were told that Dr. X was an ex-
cellent research scientist at University Y, then they might also expect him 
to be ah excellent teacher in the classroom. This being the case, then those 
subjects who are told that Dr. X is only a slightly better than average 
teacher (a piece of information which would normally be somewhat positively 
evaluated) by contrast to their first piece of information that Dr. X was 
an excellent researcher would not have their expectations met and hence there 
would be a displacement of the subject's evaluation of the stimulus object in 
a downward direction ~ hence the averaging effect. 
Likewise, those subjects given as their first piece of information that 
Dr. X is a slightly better than average teacher would evaluate the man to 
. . n 
only a slightly positive extent and hence their expectations of the man 
would not be as great as those subjects who are told that Dr. X is an ex-
cellent researcher, i.e., their adaptation level is lower; however, when 
these subjects are told that in addition to being only a slightly better 
than average teacher, Dr. X is also an excellent researcher, this piece of 
information more than meets their expectations concerning the man and hence 
the additional piece of information "Dr. X is an excellent researcher" bas 
the effect of increasing the subjects evaluation of the man. 
It is to be noted that Osgood's congruity theory would have made the 
same prediction in the above situation but in terms of the subjects striving 
to.maintain cognitive balance or congruity. However, let us take another 
situation to point out the difference between Osgood's congruity model and 
. 
the fulcrum model especially with respect to the expectations of the subject. 
Suppose that a departmental committee on faculty appointments was looking 
for a man to join their department. let us further-suppose the department 
consisted of a staff in which everyone was an excellent teacher but that 
no one was doing any research and hence their concern was for a man who 
was an excellent researcher and that they were not at all concerned about 
the type of teacher this man was, i.e., being an excellent researcher was 
of prime importance (+7) on a 0 to +7 scale, and teaching qualities not 
being of any concern to the appointment committee receives a weight of 
zero (0). 
The problem with Osgood's (1963) extension of his congruity theory is 
the assumed isomorphism between the subject's affective response to a piece 
of information and the weight given to that piece of information in fonning 
an impression, i.e., in looking at Osgo~d's extension of his congruity theory: 
32 
• 
Predicted Attitude 
where lail and (a.j} = the absolute and algebraic evaluation 
of the "ith" piece of information 
= the absolute and algebraic evaluation 
of the noun modified by i-1 pieces of 
information. 
Thus, if a subject affectively evaluates a piece of information as +J, 
the weight given to that piece of information is also +J and if a subject 
affectively evaluates a piece of information as +l, the weight given to 
that piece of information is also +l; this theoretical thinking is in accord 
with the work of Podell and Podell (1963) which suggests that extreme pieces 
of information are given greater weight than pieces of information of inter-
mediate value. The fulcrum model on the other hand assigns a separate weight 
to a piece of information on the basis of the importance of that information 
to the subject. 
Going bac~ then to our committee on faculty appointments, they have a 
need for an excellent researcher and obtaining such a man can reduce or 
satisfy (at least partially) this need, hence great importance is placed 
on the trait "excellent researcher"; and because there is no need for the 
man to be an excellent teacher, this trait is given no weight or importance 
at all - hence it bas a value of zero. 
Suppose now that the committee on faculty appointments obtained a letter 
of recommendation concerning an applicant in which it was indicated that 
the candidate was an excellent researcher but only a slightly better than 
. 
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average researcher. Further, assume that excelent researchers are affectively 
evaluated as +3 on a -3 to +3 scale and that slightly better than average 
teachers are evaluated as +l on the same scale. Then Osgood's prediction 
concerning the candidate would be~ 
Predicted attitude = !JI (+3) + Ill (+J) ~""'1-"l J::.;-J -+---.1:-'p=--.;J'"'"""' 
= 9 + 1 
- 4 = 2.5 
However, the fulcrum prediction would be: 
Predicted Attitude = Ji A.I. 2.. l. l. 
.i.~1_ 
%_ I
1
. 
v-1 
= (+J};j-7) + (1) (o) = 3 
7 + 0 
Hence, being only a slightly better than average teacher would be super-
fluous information to the committee on appointments according to the Fulcrum 
model, but according to Osgood's model it would hurt the candidate. However, 
according to S. Rosenberg (1968), a person may (depending on the occasion) 
ignore or assign weights of zero to some information. Hence, according to 
the Fulcrum model, the weight assigned to a piece of information depends on 
the make-up of the individual and his needs and what be considers to be im-
portant and.does not necessarily carry the weight whose values is equal to 
the affective evaluation of the piece of information. This, however, is a 
point to be explored in future research. 
The Fulcrum model also bas some interesting implications with respect 
to source effects, and traits of the subject receiving the information such 
as intelligence and qogrnatism. With regard to source effects one would expect 
more of an averaging effect and hence a less positive evaluation of a stimulus 
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object with a high source than with a low source even if all information 
presented is positive. For example, if a high source said that a man was. 
an excellent researcher, the general tendency of the recipient of the in-
formation might be that the man was also an excellent teacher, hence his ex-
pectations concerning the man as a teacher would be quite high. As a result 
of such high expectations any information which did.not meet these expecta-
tions (e.g., the man is only an average teacher) would by contrast lessen 
the evaluation of the man; one might expect that the contrast between the 
expectation of the man and the actual information obtained would be greater 
if it stemmed from a high source than a low source and hence the high source 
would result in a less favorable impression of the man. 
With regard to intelligence, one might expect that the more intelligent 
subject might have a greater capacity to have differential expectations con-
cerning the traits of an object and hence if they are told that a candidate 
for an academic position is an excellent researcher, their expectations con-
cerning the teaching qualities of the man might be more realistic than his 
lesser intelligent counterpart who following the "great man theory" might 
have high expectations concerning the candidate in all areas, hence the con-
trast then between the expectations of the high intelligent subject concerriing 
the candidate and the actual obtained infonnation on other traits may not be 
as great and hence there would be less of an averaging effect. One might 
also expect the reverse finding for dogmatic subjects, i.e., the higher the 
D score of the subject the ~ the averaging effect obtained. Although just 
speculation, these hypotheses would provide interesting topics for further 
research. 
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Appendix I 
List of Issues Evaluated by 
Pre-Experimental Subjects 
attacking organized crime 
highway expansion program 
European Common Market 
federal aid to education 
farm program 
prison reform 
nuclear test ban treaty 
gun control 
eliminating the draft 
open housing 
lowering the voting age to 18 
foreign aid program 
decreasing foreig~ travel 
increasing tariffs 
political patronage system 
eliminating capital punishment 
legalizing marihuana 
social welfare program 
farm program 
Southeast Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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